Introduction
A key concern for policy makers interested in citizen engagement is the need to ensure that settled migrants participate in the civic life of the recipient society, as it is often seen as an expression of successful incorporation of migrants in their society of residence. This article analyses the variations of patterns of voting behaviour at local elections among migrants in two municipalities: Malmö in Sweden and the London borough of Ealing in the UK. The studied groups are Somalis, and Poles who emigrated after the European Union enlargement in 2004.
For the argument of this article, I limit my analysis to conventional political participation, i.e.
voting. I see political participation as one of the several dimensions of political integration, the others being political trust and adherence to democratic values (Tillie 2004) . I appreciate that less conventional forms of political activities as for instance protests, sit-ins, demonstrations, and boycotts are expressions of political participation. However, they fall outside the scope of my data.
Theoretically, the article bridges two bodies of work that analyse migrant political participation. On the one hand, the strand of literature analysing the institutional and discursive structures that influence migrant political participation (Ireland 1994; Koopmans et al. 2005 ).
On the other, the perspectives in social psychology emphasising the role of collective identifications for political mobilisation (Simon et al. 1998; Huddy 2001; ; Hopkins & KahaniHopkins 2004; ) and in particular the work on dual identification (Gaertner et al. 1993; Dovidio et al. 2007; Brown 2003, 2005) and its significance for political engagement (Simon and Ruhs 2008; Klandermans et al. 2008; Simon and Grabow 2010; Hopkins 2011) . I contribute to the literature on migrant political participation and voting behaviour by integrating these two bodies of work, which have historically been treated separately. To analyse not only the formal settings in which migrants operate and how they may favour or constrain migrants' political participation, but also how migrants' identifications and interrelationships with their in-group and the recipient society can influence their political decisions, will lend stronger explanatory power to the analysis of migrant voting behaviour at local elections. The second contribution of the article is empirical, as it presents original crossnational comparative data on Somalis, who are usually perceived as non-integrated (Open society Foundation 2014), and on Poles, who are instead seen as well-integrated in the recipient society (Düvell and Garapich 2011) . The data shows that public perceptions of integration of these groups do not necessarily coincide with migrants' identifications and perceptions of belonging to the society of settlement. In this sense, this research can offer insight into how minority groups may experience their polity membership.
In the following, I develop a theoretical framework to explain variations in political participation amongst migrants by integrating a political opportunity structure approach with the literature on dual identification and collective action. I then present the data and methods used in the analysis. In section three, I discuss the national institutional environments in the UK and Sweden with particular reference to policy approaches to diversity, citizenship and migrants' voting rights. Section four presents the institutional and discursive local contexts at the hearth of this study. This is followed by the analysis of the cross-group and cross-city variations in the voting behaviour of Somalis and Poles in Ealing and Malmö. Section six investigates the participants' sense of dual identification. The aim is to study the extent to which dual identification affects participation and how institutional and discursive settings in the recipient society influence the degree of dual identification experienced by migrants. The final section discusses the findings.
Theoretical background
Migrants in Europe are usually underrepresented in the political process. Especially nonEuropean (non-EU) citizens have limited political rights which constrain their opportunities to influence the policies that affect them daily 1 . Where non-EU migrants can vote either because of the institutional structure of the state in question or because they have naturalised, their turnout tends to be lower than the native population (Messina 2007 Drawing upon a political opportunity structure approach (Tarrow 1994) , the first body of research argues that to understand the political participation of groups, we need to account for the opportunities and constraints provided by the institutional and discursive structures within which a group can mobilise (Koopmans et al. 2005) . Cross-national comparative research on migrant mobilisation shows that the political space available for migrants to put forward group demands varies among countries. This matters, as "the nationally specific approaches to granting formal citizenship rights matter in giving migrants the confidence to feel sufficiently part of a society to make group-specific demands on it" (Koopmans 2004, 152) . Researchers working within this tradition explain cross-group differences in engagement with the political process with reference to contextual factors. Berger, Galonska and Koopmans (2004) , in a study testing the social capital hypothesis (Fennema and Tillie 1999) on three migrant groups living in Berlin, confirm the importance of national and local structures of opportunities (e.g.
access to nationality) which can lead to cross-group behavioural differences. Whether groups face favourable opportunities, both institutional and in the public discourse, is important to explain their participation in civic and political activities.
Participation in elections is not just a matter of political structures, however. I argue that identification is an important factor that we need to analyse to understand migrant political participation. The literature on political opportunity structures refers to the role of identification for understanding migrant political participation and claims making. However, scholars working in this tradition tend to analyse either ascribed identities, or the forms of identifications that are visible in the public sphere, such as e.g. their 'racial' group, their ethnicity, or nationality (see e.g. Koopmans et al. 2005, 114-126) . While important, this does not account for how migrants construe their identities in relation to their in-group and the recipient society, so that they can formulate their perceived inclusion in or exclusion from the nation. This is important because, as demonstrated in research in political psychology, identification with a group motivates people's participation in political action (de Weerd and Klandermans 1999; Huddy 2001 ). I now turn to political psychology to better understand the role of collective identification as a motive for political participation.
Psychologists have long criticised the rationalistic and individualistic explanations for participation in collective action. A rationalist perspective understands political and social actions as the outcome of rational, individual cost-benefit calculations (Elster 1989) . Social psychologists have criticised this perspective for neglecting of the role of collective identification processes in shaping political behaviour (Gamson 1992; Simon et al. 1998) . In a critique of rational actor theory, Hopkins and Kahani-Hopkins (2004) is not the individual instrumental rationality to determine Muslims' political activity, but that the latter is shaped by socially shared and created collective self-definition. This criticism is in line with Social Identity Theory and Self-Categorization Theory (Tajfel & Turner 1979; Turner et al. 1987) , which argue for the fundamental role of collective identification processes in group behaviour. Today, there is significant research demonstrating that identification with a group predicts willingness to participate in collective action on behalf of that movement (Simon et al. 1998; De Weerd and Klandermans 1999; Simon and Grabow 2010) . Scholars working in this field argue that, in order to understand collective mobilisation, researchers need to understand instrumental factors, such as the costs and benefits of participation, as well as factors related to identification with the movement.
In this article, I see engagement in elections as a form of political mobilisation that requires a degree of identification as citizen of the country in which elections are held. Indeed, voting can be an important measure of inclusion because it taps onto the degree to which individuals feel that they should take part in the decision-making process at a very broad level. This type of identification bears similarities with what is known in the literature as 'dual identity' (Gaertner et al. 1993; Dovidio et al. 2007; Gonzales & Brown 2003 , 2006 . A dual identification requires that individuals see themselves as members of different groups and at the same time part of the same superordinate entity. For instance, migrants could be considered holding a dual identification if they were able to identify with their national group (e.g. Polish) as well as feeling part of the wider national polity (e.g. Britain). To hold a 'dual identity' does not mean that identities are two-dimensional and mutually exclusive. Psychology has demonstrated that individuals identify with several groups simultaneously. These identifications cannot be separated out into discrete strands. Rather, they are the result of complex intersections of cultural, national, religious, ethnic, gendered, and class-related identifications (Hopkins & Greenwood 2013) .These multiple belongings can be experienced in different ways and the ability of a person to perform one's multiple identifications as, for instance, Muslim and Swede, depends on whether the wider society validates this dual identification. Hence, dual identification can only arise as the result of self-identification and of the validation of that (dual or multiple) identification by the wider polity (Hopkins 2011) . Validation comes from fellow citizens and from institutions, and derives in part from the national discursive structures of opportunities that define 'civic' or 'ethnic' conceptions of belonging (Brubaker 1992) . In experimental settings, Wakefield and colleagues (2011) show that these understandings of nationhood can have an effect for how people, who associate themselves with the nation, are treated. A 'civic' understanding of the nation tends to predict an inclusive understanding of who is part of the national community. This is in line with the findings of Pehrson et al. (2009) that an ethnic definition of national belonging predicts stronger anti-immigrant prejudice than a civic one.
To identify as part of the country in which one lives and with the minority group one feels a sense of belonging to, feeds positively into a migrant's perception of satisfaction with her situation, and it is a necessary element to mobilise for political action (Klandermans et al. 2008) . Dual identification fosters a perception of entitlement among migrants that may favour participation (Klandermans et al. 2008) . Indeed, if members of a minority group perceive themselves to be entitled to the same outcomes as those of the majority society, this is indicative of the former's sense of identification with the supra-ordinate group (Wenzel 2000) . It is therefore likely that the stronger a migrant's sense of belonging to the recipient country, the more likely she will feel entitled to the same rights and duties of the majority society. This is supported by survey data. In a study on the implications of people's identification with Britain for their civic attitudes and behaviour, Heath and Roberts (2008) found a strong association between a strong sense of belonging to Britain and turnout in elections.
To conclude, a focus on both the relevant political opportunity structures, and on the role of intersecting identifications, will lend a stronger explanatory power into the research on political participation. The former sets out the criteria which formally shape migrant political participation. The latter tells us if migrants feel part of the recipient society to such an extent that they feel entitled to become politically involved.
Data and methods
In this article I analyse 68 semi-structured interviews conducted between 2011 and 2012 in Malmö and Ealing with Somalis, and Poles who emigrated after the European enlargement in 2004. Table 1 summarises the demographic details of the sample.
----- 
Local contexts and discursive environments
Malmö and Ealing are of similar size and characterised by an ethnically diverse population, as shown in Table 2 . With a population of 339.300 inhabitants (as of 2011), Ealing is among the largest boroughs of London. It has experienced a large influx of migrants since the 1950s, mainly from the Indian subcontinent, which has resulted in the settlement of significant Indian (Meer and Modood 2013) . This legal framework, which is in line with a 'civic' citizenship model, has been paralleled by a pluralist approach to cultural differences which allows different ethnic groups to follow a variety of cultural patterns in the private domain. Sweden is internationally renowned as officially and successfully promoting multiculturalism (Castles and Miller 1998) and for adopting a 'civic' model of citizenship (Weldon 2006 The representations of Poles and Somalis in the public discourse in the two municipalities are similar. Somalis are often portrayed as a problem community, as the policy-makers I have interviewed suggest.
3 Jus soli is a principle of nationality law by which citizenship is determined by place of birth. 4 Time requirement is reduced to three years if the applicant is married to or a civil partner of a British citizen. 5 Jus sanguinis is the principle of nationality law by which citizenship is determined by having one or both parents who are citizens of the state. 6 Citizens from other Nordic country have a residence requirement of two years. By and large, policy-makers in the two cities are positive about Polish migration. Their contribution seems to be mainly economic, as stressed in the quotes above. Their employment rates in both countries have been very high, they are generally praised for their strong work ethics, and the educational attainment of Polish pupils is as high as the average, if not higher (Sumption et al. 2009; Wadensjö 2012; Geay et al. 2013; Gärdqvist 2010) . In the analysis I will discuss if these perceptions of Somalis and Poles respectively are reflected in how the participants construe identification with the recipient society.
Political participation -do Somalis and Poles vote?
In the following three sections, I analyse the interviews we conducted with Poles and Somalis.
I first describe the respondents' expressed intentions to participate in local elections. The following section explores participants' constructions of their collective identification. More specifically, I focus on the diverse accounts of inter-identification synergies, and explore the varying degree of identification with both the minority group and the majority group simultaneously.
Whether migrants are voluntarily involved in broad political activities, such as voting, is a sign of inclusion in the recipient society. Given the policy-makers' understandings of which community is better integrated, we expected that Poles exercise their right to participate in local elections to a larger extent than Somalis, who are considered a marginalised community. My data shows the opposite pattern. When asked if they have voted at local elections, only three Polish participants on a total sample of 30 say they had. The low degree of participation among the interviewees can be explained in two ways. One has to do with the lack of knowledge of their rights. Several respondents did not know that they have the right to vote in local elections. In fact, any resident can vote at local elections in Sweden, and EU citizens can vote in local elections in both countries. The misinformation regarding migrant voting rights points at a failed dialogue between migrants and the local and national institutions. This contributes to a democratic deficit that sees migrants at the margins of the polity where they live and not fully involved in them. The second explanation could be related to their identification with their mother country and the recipient society respectively, as suggested by the Polish woman quoted above. Somalis often refer to Somalia as their home country, but they are not able to exercise their voting rights there. Naturalisation contributes to enhance their identification as British or Swedish citizens and affects their political behaviour.
Poles instead identify strongly with Poland and feel that their civic allegiance is with their
homeland. This shapes their political behaviour.
Dual identity and participation
The cross-national, cross-group comparison at the heart of this study shows that, despite similar institutional structures, there are intra-group variations in voting behaviour. Somalis participants in Malmö tend to vote to a lesser degree than those in Ealing, while the Polish interviewees usually do not participate in local elections at all. Partly, many Somalis in Malmö do not know that they can vote at local elections. Another factor which may explain this is the degree to which Somalis identify with their society of residence, i.e. the degree to which they have been able to develop a dual identification. In this section I examine whether the respondents identify with the majority society, as well as their in-group and if this dual identification has an effect on their political behaviour.
In Malmö and Ealing, Poles tend to give similar answers about the perceived valence of naturalizing, exemplified by the quote below. The interviewee has lived in Malmö for two years with his family, yet he cannot fully feel that he is part of it. He partly blames the Swedes' unwillingness to establish relationships with Poles.
In Ealing, the response is different, as the participants express an idea of belonging to the city of residence. This has created an environment which is possibly more welcoming to immigrants than other cities, which may have experience mass-migration flows more recently. This is challenging to some, as the quote above indicates, but it nevertheless creates a space within which migrants can try their luck and settle.
Somalis perceive and enact their identities differently. In both cities they identify primarily as My data seem to indicate that identification with the recipient society is a significant factor that impacts on migrants' decision on whether to participate in local elections or not. Poles, who do not identify with the recipient society, do not participate in conventional politics there -but feel however it is their right and duty to vote at elections in Poland. Somalis who identify with the country in which they live, tend participate in local elections because they feel entitled to do so as British citizens. Their identification as refugees seems to have an effect on their political behaviour. As the woman above indicates, being a refugee and losing the right to vote in her home country, has led her and her family to value participation in elections and to become aware that the electoral outcomes will affect them directly. Those who have not naturalised are not interested in participating in conventional politics and tend not to identify as members of the wider society. This could be a reaction of the lack of social recognition of their belonging to the recipient society. In the next section, I show that the socio-political context in which the two migrant groups live is a contributing factor to the development of a sense of dual identification.
The importance of opportunity structures for dual identification
My data shows cross-national variations in Somalis' voting behaviour. The respondents living in Ealing seem to be more likely to participate in local elections than their Swedish counterparts, even if they can benefit from the same opportunities to vote in local elections.
One of the reasons for this difference seems to be the degree to which Somalis in the two municipalities have been able to develop a dual identification.
The UK provides an environment where Somalis can preserve their religious and national identifications, while also identifying with the wider British society. Numbers help in creating a sense of belonging to the environment in which the participants live, as this woman says. Both respondents explicitly refer to the British political opportunity structure and to British multiculturalism in particular. They describe it as an important element which enables them to express and live out their religion and at the same time identify with the wider polity. The
British 'civic' model of citizenship could be a factor that has helped Somalis' inclusion in the The sense of entitlement to which the last quotation refers, could be a factor which may contribute to a more complete understanding of political participation among migrants. 
Concluding discussion
The analysis of the interviews with 68 Somalis and Poles living in Malmö and Ealing lends support to the argument that, while favourable local and national structures of opportunities are necessary to enable migrants to vote, they alone are not enough. The chosen municipalities formally provide favourable opportunities to participate in local election. Yet, the Somali interviewees in Ealing tend to participate in local elections more than the other groups. The data suggests that their sense of identification with the wider polity is an important factor that can explain their mobilisation at local elections. This lends support to the critiques of rationalistic models of political decision making (e.g. and citizenship would benefit from exploring participants' own constructions of identifications and the effects of these on political behaviour. As this article shows, this research should be paralleled by the study of institutional and discursive structures of opportunities and the ways in which these can shape the space in which identifications are constructed. In the realm of practical politics, policy-makers should engage in a more attentive and responsive dialogue with different groups in society to define 'integration'
and 'participation'. To assess migrant minorities' competence and incorporation in society according to pre-defined domains runs the risk of disregarding some groups' needs and feelings of exclusion, as it appears to be the case for several Polish participants.
